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Vega: Buyer or Victim Beware?: Successor Liability Doctrine Lacks Prope

NOTES
BUYER OR VICTIM BEWARE? SUCCESSOR LIABILITY DOCTRINE
LACKS PROPER PROTECTION FOR VICTIMS OF DISCRIMINATION AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. A HistoricEnactment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in order to
prohibit employment discrimination based on an individual's race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin.' Congress initially intended for Title
VII to "foster voluntary compliance," but it quickly became a common
route for litigation.2 It was expected that employers would adopt
practices that would reduce the likelihood of employment
discrimination, while also raising awareness of equal employment
opportunities.3 Though most employers have adopted such antiharassment policies, employment discrimination and sexual harassment
are still blatantly present in the workplace.
After multiple amendments, Title VII states that it shall be unlawful
for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or to
limit, segregate, or classify an individual "in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee." 4 Title VII, as
previously mentioned, also prohibits offensive conduct based on an
individual's race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.5 The conduct
must be unwelcomed and offensive, and either severe or pervasive. 6

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

H.R. REP. NO. 914, at 26 (1964), as reprintedin 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2401.
See Stache v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers, 852 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988).
See Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
Public Health and Welfare §§ 1401-3549, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
Id.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
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Employers are required to take appropriate steps to prevent and correct
any form of discrimination and harassment.7
Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks... and any agent
of such a person." 8 In furtherance of Congress' intent to limit liability to
employers with fifteen or more employees, courts have refused to hold
individuals liable under Title VII. 9 The court in Tomka v. Seiler Corp.
held that the employer as a whole, rather than one individual in an
authoritative position is more likely to have the means to provide
equitable remedies of back pay to an aggrieved employee. 10 In Grigsby
v. Johnson, the Court dismissed a sexual harassment claim against the
plaintiff's supervisor (in his personal capacity) because he could not be
held individually liable under Title VII. 11 The proper defendant, the
court concluded, was the head of the agency where the harassment took
place. 12 After Title VII was amended in 1991, it allowed employees and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")-on behalf
of the employee-to sue an employer in court for lost wages, benefits,
reinstatement, and attorneys' fees, but compensatory and punitive
damages however, are capped based on the size of the employer. 3
Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to issue rules and regulations, hold annual review and
approval of equal employment opportunity plans, and other similar
responsibilities. 14 Congress gave the EEOC the authority to enforce
Title VII and its rules and regulations in whatever way they deem
reasonable and appropriate.1 5 Before an employee can file against
their
16
employer under Title VII, they must file a charge with the EEOC.
The EEOC has developed its own guidelines and issued procedures
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
9. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Edsall v.
Assumption Coll., 367 F. Supp. 2d 72, 77 (D. Mass. 2005) (refusing to hold an individual liable the
court stated, "[t]his court agrees with the overwhelming weight of authority that Title VII does not
provide for individual liability.").
10. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.
11. Grigsby v. Johnson, No. 95-213, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7034, at *1-6 (D.C. May 13,
1996).
12. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
14. See id. § 2000e-16(b).
15. Id.
16.

U.S

EQUAL

EMP'T

OPPORTUNITY

COMM'N,

Filing

a

Lawsuit,

EEOC,

http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
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governing claimants and the filing process. 17 An employee alleging
discrimination is required to use state and local administrative agencies
to remedy their claims before filing Title VII charges with the EEOC.' 8
The employee has 300 days from the date when the alleged
discrimination took place to file a claim with the EEOC. 19 The EEOC
must wait until the state agency has ceased action before it processes the
employee's charge and begins its own investigation.2 ° If the alleged
discrimination occurred in a location without a designated state or local
agency to handle the claim, the employee has 180 days from the date
when the alleged discrimination took place to file a claim with the
EEOC. 2 ' If the EEOC finds that the claim has merit, the EEOC may sue
the employer on behalf of the employee, or it can give the employee a
"Notice-of-Right-to-Sue" letter that will allow the employee to begin the
22
litigation process on their own. However, if the EEOC finds that the
employee's claim or claims lack merit, the EEOC must23 dismiss the
so.
charge and inform the complainant of the decision to do
When an EEOC-reviewed Title VII claim finally reaches the courts,
the courts are not required to give binding deference to the EEOC's
findings, but they usually will defer to them. 24 However, the courts have
refused to excuse plaintiffs from the ninety-day statute of limitations for
filing suit in court regardless of the EEOC's findings.2 5
Lastly, as a preventive measure, the EEOC has also advised
businesses to take certain steps during the purchase agreement in order
26
to avoid successor liability in pending Title VII suits.

In order to

assure that the obligations imposed by a settlement are carried out in the
event of a transfer in ownership of the defendant, or a transfer of any of
its assets, the EEOC recommends that following provisions be included

17. U.S EQUAL EMp'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC Subregulatory Guidance, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/index.cfim (last visited Oct. 26, 2017).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c).
19. Id. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
20. Id. § 2000e-5(d).
21. Id.§ 2000e-5(e)(1).
22. Id.; see also U.s EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Filing a Lawsuit, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfim (last visited Oct. 11, 2017).
23. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(b).
24. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 59, 65 (1986).
25. See U.s EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Filing a Lawsuit, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfin (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (exemplifying that there is
no extensions given if a plaintiff fails to file a lawsuit within the 90 day filing period).
26. U.s EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Settlement Standardsand Procedures,EEOC,
(last
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/manua/3-4-a-settlementstandards.cfm#section2b8
visited Oct. 13, 2017).
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in resolution documents, "a statement that the defendant will provide
prior written notice to any potential purchaser of defendant's business or
assets, and to any other potential successor, of the Commission's
lawsuit, the allegations raised in the Commission's complaint, and the
existence and contents of the settlement., 27 Therefore, the well-known
notion of "buyer-beware" is conveyed to potential buyers before they
purchase any company.2 8 If that buyer is in fact aware of any pending
claims or past illegal employment practice by their predecessor, it is up
to them whether to accept the consequences of the likelihood of being
hailed into court sooner or later.
The concept that the drafting of an asset purchase agreement can
prevent the business from being held liable is reiterated throughout the
legal field.29 Corporate attorneys everywhere are trained to follow these
EEOC guidelines and the additional guidelines of their firms. 30 "The
involvement of competent counsel in the negotiating and drafting of an
asset purchase agreement can significantly reduce the risk of postclosing litigation, the implication of the successor liability doctrine."31
In many cases, the cost to litigate a successor liability claim will
substantially outweigh the benefits and the assets that the buyer receives
from a purchase agreement.3 2
B. Not Just Business
In an economy with an abundance of business deals, there is no
shortage of mergers and buyouts. When purchasing a business, a buyer
will either enter into a stock or an asset purchase agreement. 33 "Under a
stock purchase transaction, the buyer acquires a majority of the seller's
27. Id.
28. Id. (explaining that when a transfer of ownership occurs, the resolution documents
statement will provide the new employer with notice of the claim prior to transferring ownership,
this ensures that the buyer may beware of all existing claims).
29. See id. (describing the legal drafting necessary to avoid successor liability); see also
Bardia Fard, Esq. & Brian Afshar (Law Clerk), PurchasingA Business: How To Avoid Successor
Liability, ACUMEN L. (July 15, 2009), http://www.acumenlawgroup.com/publicationcategories/purchasing-a-business-how-to-avoid-inadvertent-assumption-of-a-sellers-iabiities/
(showing that law groups are continuing to educate the legal community on the concept of draffing
asset purchase agreements to avoid liability).
30.

See U.S EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC Subregulatory Guidance, EEOC,

https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/index.cfin (last visited Oct. 13, 2017) (discussing the EEOC
guidelines that are used to explain how laws and regulations apply to workplace situations, which
employees are commonly trained to follow).
31. Bardia Fard, Esq. & Brian Afshar (Law Clerk), supra note 29.
32. See id
33. See id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss1/7

4

Vega: Buyer or Victim Beware?: Successor Liability Doctrine Lacks Prope
2017]

BUYER OR VICTIMBEWARE

shares. 34 The business's underlying assets are still owned by the entity
but the buyer now owns the entity.35 On the other hand, under an asset
purchase agreement, the seller retains ownership of the entity but
relinquishes all of its assets to the buyer.36 Generally, the transfer of
those assets to the buyer leaves the buyer "free and clear" from any prior
liabilities.3 7 However, the successor liability doctrine functions as an
exception to this general rule if the required factors are met. 38
The successor liability doctrine varies among the states and their
respective courts. The national development of the successor liability
doctrine "began with a series of U.S. Supreme Court cases" in a labor
and employment law context. 39 The Supreme Court has continuously
reiterated the importance of prior notice to the buyer of the potential
liabilities it may inherit, so that it may become a part of the negotiation
or the sale contract. 40 However, an overarching federal law or regulation
to control successor liability does not exist.
The Sixth Circuit was the first to apply the successor liability
doctrine to a Title VII case in EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers,
Inc. In MacMillan, the plaintiff employee followed the necessary
procedure of filing a Title VII claim with the EEOC against her
employer, Flintkote Company.4 1 During the EEOC investigation, the
defendant, MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., acquired the office
where the plaintiff was an employee.4 2 The EEOC found the plaintiff's
claim to have merit and filed a claim on her behalf against the defendant
as the successor.43 The Sixth Circuit indicated that in order for a
successor employer to inherit liability in a Title VII case, it must be
determined on a case-by-case basis in reference to its own particular
facts.44
The Sixth Circuit concluded further that the evaluation of successor
liability on a case-by-case basis should include the consideration of nine
factors: (1) Whether the successor employer had notice of the pending

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
B. J., no.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Travis R. Hollifield, Successor Liability Issues in Labor and Employment Cases, 81 FLA.
1, 48, 48 (2007).
See id.
E.E.O.C. v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1088 (6th Cir. 1974).
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1091.
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charge or claim before they agreed to the acquisition; (2) The ability of
the predecessor to provide proper relief; (3) Whether there has been a
substantial continuity of business operations; (4) Whether the successor
employer uses the same plant; (5) Whether the successor employer uses
the same or substantially the same workforce; (6) Whether the successor
employer uses the same or substantially the same supervisory personnel;
(7) Whether the same jobs exist under the same or substantially the same
working conditions; (8) Whether the successor employer uses the same
or substantially the same machinery, equipment, and methods of
production; and (9) Whether the successor employer produces the same
product.45
In deciding this way, the Sixth Circuit wanted to uphold the intent
of Congress when they drafted Title VII to protect employees from
unfair employment practices.46 The court again expressed that these
cases must be decided on a case-by-case basis and stated,
We hold only that Title VII per se does not prohibit the
application of the successor doctrine, but rather
mandates its application. Title VII was designed to
eliminate discrimination in employment and the courts
were given broad equitable powers to eradicate the
present and future effects of past discrimination...
Failure to hold a successor employer liable for the
discriminatory practices of its predecessor could
emasculate the relief provisions of Title VII by leaving
the discriminatee without a remedy or with an
incomplete remedy.4 7
The court also went on to discuss the other requirements of filing a
Title VII claim when the plaintiff asks the court to apply the successor
liability doctrine and the importance of analyzing the doctrine in a way
that is not unduly burdensome upon the successor.4 8 In particular, the
45. Id. at 1094.
46. See id.
at 1096.
47. Id. at 1091.
48. See id. at 1090 ("Appropriate steps must still be taken if the effects of the unfair labor
practices are to be erased and all employees reassured of their statutory rights. And it is the
successor who has taken over control of the business who is generally in the best position to remedy
such unfair labor practices most effectively. The imposition of this responsibility upon even the
bona fide purchaser does not work an unfair hardship upon him. When he substituted himself in
place of the perpetrator of the unfair labor practices, he became the beneficiary of the unremedied
unfair labor practices. Also, his potential liability for remedying the unfair labor practices is a matter
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court found the filing of a charge with the EEOC to be a "well settled...
condition precedent" to a suit in court.49
The Sixth Circuit has had an extremely influential role on
subsequent Title VII claims in a successor liability context.5 ° It later
went on to require the prior notice factor as an "initial hurdle that must
be cleared" before considering the remaining factors. 51 A majority of
the circuits agree that a successor can be held liable for a Title VII claim
against a predecessor employer using the nine factors of MacMillan for
analysis on a case-by-case basis.52 The court in Burt v. Ramada Inn
refused to hold a successor employer liable when it was unaware of both
the former employee and the pending charges.5 3 The court in U.S. v.
Sheriff of Assumption Parrish held that summary judgment for the
successor employer was inappropriate due to the fact-based nature of the
inquiry required under MacMillan.54 The court in EEOC v. Nichols Gas
& Oil, Inc. held the successor employer could be held liable for
compensatory damages, but not punitive damages because punitive
damages are intended to punish the actual wrongdoer (predecessor).55
Lastly, the court in Johns v. Harborage I Ltd. held the successor
employer liable because there was a substantial continuity of business
operations.56
Moreover, some courts have condensed the nine factors set forth in
MacMillan and apply only three factors when determining whether to
hold a successor employer liable in a Title VII suit. 57 The refined threefactor test requires courts to consider: (1) whether the successor
employer had prior notice of the pending claim against the predecessor;
(2) whether the predecessor is able to provide the requested relief; and
(3) whether there is sufficient continuity in the business operations of the
predecessor and the successor to justify the imposition of liability.5 8
which can be reflected in the price he pays for the business, or he may secure an indemnity clause in
the sales contract which will indemnify him for liability arising from the seller's unfair labor
practices." (quoting Perma Vinyl Corp.. 164 N.L.R.B. 119, 969 (1967)).
49.

MacMillan, 503 F.2d at 1092.

50. See Hollifield, supra note 39, at 50.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. Burt v. Ramada Inn, 507 F. Supp. 336, 338 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
54. See U.S. v. Sheriff of Assumption Parrish, No. 94-3656, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15017, at
*6 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 1995).
55. EEOC v. Nichols Gas & Oil, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 193,204-05 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
56. Johns v. Harborage I Ltd., 664 N.W.2d 291, 299 (Minn. 2003).
57.

See Rego v. ARC Water Treatment Co., 181 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 1999); see also

Criswell v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1989).
58. See Brzozowski v. Correctional Physician Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2004)

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

7

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:1

The court in Walker v. Faith Techs., Inc. followed the reduction of
the original MacMillan factors down to the three-prong test for successor
liability and afforded extra weight to the first two factors. 59 On the other
hand, some courts have considered these factors and still held that the
mere acquisition of the assets of a charged employer at a foreclosure sale
is not sufficient to impose successor liability, despite continuity of
business.6 °
Lastly, courts will also refuse to hold a successor liable if the seller
sold their assets fraudulently or in an attempt to escape their liabilities.61
The court will look for certain "badges of fraud" in order to determine
whether the sale was in good faith. Any of the following is considered a
"badge of fraud:" (1) A close relationship among the parties to the
transaction; (2) A secret and hasty transfer not in the usual course of
business; (3) inadequacy of consideration; and (4) retention of control of
the property by the transferor after the conveyance.6 2
C. A CircuitSplit
In many successor liability cases, courts have indicated that there
should be a "distinct predicate factor to consider before" considering the
nine factors from MacMillan.63 The Eleventh Circuit has chosen to
consider whether privity exists between the predecessor employer and
the successor employer as that predicate factor.64 In Coffinan v.
Chugach Support Services, the court held that the plaintiff "must show
some kind of sale, merger, or other type of direct acquisition by 65
a
imposed.
be
may
liability
successor
before
('privity')
successor
Furthermore, "since there was no merger or transfer of assets between
the former employer and the new service provider, the court refused to
impose successor liability upon the new service provider.66 The Sixth
Circuit takes a different view of whether a showing of privity between

(citing Rego v. ARC Water Treatment Co., 181 F.3d 396 (3d Cir. 1999)).
59. Walker v. Faith Techs., Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1267 (D. Kan. 2004).
60. Id. at 1261.
61. Successor Liability in Asset Purchases under New York Law, CAMPOLO, MIDDLETON, &
MCCORMICK LLP., (Jan. 22, 2016) http://cmmllp.com/successor-liability-in-asset-purchases-undernew-york-law/
62. Id.
63. See Hollifield, supra note 39 at 51.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 51 (quoting Coffman v. Chugach Support Services, Inc., 411 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir.
2005)).
66. Id.
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should always be a necessity before
the predecessor and the successor
67
imposing successor liability.
As successor liability theory developed and adapted to modem day
business practices, the Sixth Circuit revisited their nine-factor test. In
Cobb v. Contract Transport, Inc., the court declined to hold that "a
merger or transfer of assets is always a precondition to successor
liability. ' 68 The Cobb Court also de-emphasized their MacMillan ninefactor balancing test and instead announced that a different three-prong
test would have authority. 69 The three-prong test requires courts, on a
fact specific case-by-case basis, to balance the interests of the defendant;
the interests of the plaintiff employee; and the goals of federal policy
and the particular legal obligation at issue. 70 The third factor is usually
weighed the most heavily. 71 Though the Sixth Circuit believes the nine
factors of MacMillan are not themselves the test for successor liability,
they did not do away completely with the nine-factor test. 72 The court
requires a hybrid analysis that considers the original nine factors when
73
applying the new three-prong balancing test in successor liability suits.
The Sixth Circuit even went on to criticize the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in Coffinan citing "outdated case law" as their deciding factors.74
This circuit split and the "subordinat[ion]" of the MacMillan nine-factor
test surely has an impact on successor liability cases today.7 5 Because
there is no overarching federal law or regulation governing successor
liability, this discrepancy in the analytical factors of successor liability
law can cause many issues within the system and for the victim
employees filing Title VII suits against successor employers. 76 In
general, the federal common law doctrine of successor liability in a Title
VII suit is broader than the successor liability under state corporations
law.77

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Cobb v. Contract Transport, Inc., 452 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2006).
See id. at 551-52.
Id.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 552-55.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 556.
See Hollifield, supra note 39.
Id.
Johns v. Harborage I Ltd., 664 N.W.2d 291, 297 (Minn. 2003).
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D. Summary
This Note will address the issues of the requirements victim
employees are required to follow in order to recover for sexual
harassment and discrimination in the workplace under the successor
liability doctrine. The EEOC has guidelines and procedures that should
be followed but the time constraints may prove to be hard to follow.
The requirement of a pending EEOC charge at the time of purchase in
order to hold a successor liable in a Title VII suit is especially
problematic. What if the alleged sexual harassment or discrimination
happened at the tail end of the prior owner's ownership? Asking a
victim employee to rush the litigation process and their healing process
is both a systemic problem and a psychological issue. Lastly, the courts
have their own way of analyzing on a case-by-case basis that could not
possibly give any victim employee a realistic expectation of what the
outcome might be. This is portrayed further through the prevalent
circuit split. The successor liability doctrine does not effectively protect
victim employees, as it should, but rather helps businesses continue to
flourish without having to worry about their former, current, or new
employees.
II. TITLE VII CLAIMS AND THE ACT'S PROGRESSION

All employment discrimination and sexual harassment claims begin
with a Title VII analysis. The enactment of Title VII was indeed
historical and an important advancement in the protection of
employees. 78 However, it also has its setbacks and kick-starts the issue
of limited protection for employees let alone those whose companies
have been reorganized or sold to new owners.79

Savvy discriminators

and successors "continue to skate through the gaping holes of Title VII
protections. 80
A. The PrimaFacie Case
Under Title VII, individual discrimination occurs when an
employee alleges her employer discriminated against her because she is
a member of a protected group based on her race, sex, national origin, or
78. See Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal Employment
Opportunity andAnti-DiscriminationProtections,18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 25, 27 (2011).
79. See id. at 48-49 (exemplifying the downfalls of Title VII through unfavorable case law).
80. Id. at 56.
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religion. 81 The plaintiff carries the burden of proving the case.
Intentional discrimination on the basis of sex can be claimed in several
situations: (1) failure to hire or promote; (2) discharge; (3) disciplinary
action; (4) constructive discharge; (5) compensation; or (6) employer
retaliation for filing a claim.82
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the process of
hiring or a promotion, an "unsuccessful applicant" or employee claiming
sexual discrimination must prove that: (1) she is a member of a protected
group; (2) she applied for an open position that she was qualified for or
expressed interest in a promotion that she was qualified for; (3) her
application was rejected; and (4) after the rejection the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants.8 3
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination for being
discharged the plaintiff must prove: (1) she is a member of a protected
group; (2) her employer's expectations were adequately met by her
performance; (3) despite her performance she was discharged or
demoted; and (4) after her termination or demotion, the employer
sought replacement or actually replaced her with a similarly qualified
individual who was not a member of the plaintiff's protected group. 84
The fourth prong of the Title VII discharge analysis has been
subjected to unclear Supreme Court interpretation and a circuit split. 85 A
majority of the circuits find that the fact that the successor is not a
member of her protected group is not determinative of the
discrimination. 86 Some circuits require the opposite and mandate that
the employer replaced the employee with someone who was not a
member of the same protected group. 87 Claims of discrimination in a
"reduction-in-force layoff' require similar elements to establish a prima
81. Dede Koffie-Lart & Christopher J. Tyson, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964, 6 GEo.
J. GENDER & L. 615,635.

82.

Id.at 638.

83. See id.; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (stating
that an employee claiming racial discrimination must prove: (1) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(2) he applied for an open position that he was qualified for; (3) despite his qualifications his
application was rejected; and (4) that the position remained open after he was rejected.).
84. Koffie-Lart & Tyson, supranote 81, at 639.
85. See id. at 638.
86. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1140-41 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 110
(2000) (exemplifying that a hispanic plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge was entitled to
recovery and satisfied the fourth element without showing that her replacement was outside of her

protected group, or that the replacement was of a different race, not Hispanic).
87. See Bradshaw v. Pac. Bell, 72 Fed. Appx. 532 (9th Cir. 2000) (showing an African
American employee failing to establish prima facie case of racial discrimination when discharged
under Title VII because of the lack evidence that the employee was replaced by someone outside of
his protected group, or that replacement was of a different race, not African American).
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facie case."
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination when an employee
is disciplined, the plaintiff must prove: (1) he or she belongs to a
protected group; (2) he or she was qualified for her job; and (3) that a
"similarly situated" employee engaged in identical or similar misconduct
89
but did not receive any discipline or received lesser discipline.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination for constructive
discharge the plaintiff must prove, "(1) he or she suffered harassment or
discrimination so intolerable that a reasonable person in the same
position would have felt compelled to resign; and (2) the employees
reaction to the workplace situation that is, his or her decision to resign
was reasonable given the totality of the circumstances." 90 This
employee felt that work conditions were so unreasonably intolerable that
she felt forced to resign. Courts require the employee to give the
employer a reasonable amount of time to correct the discriminatory
practice before she resigns. 9' The Court will consider whether the
employer had notice of the harassment before holding them
responsible.92
To establish a prima facie case of wage or salary discrimination, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) she is a member of a protected group; and (2)
she was paid less than non-members of her group for substantially the
same performance. 93 Title VII wage or salary discrimination are most
commonly sex-based discrimination between females and their male
successors. These claims are similar to Equal Pay Act claims.94
To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation, a
plaintiff must prove: (1) she engaged in protected conduct under Title
VII; (2) she suffered a negative employment action; and (3) a causal
connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.95 This is common if the employees or applicants for
88. See Bellaver v: Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 2000).
89. Alexander v. Fulton Cty., 207 F.3d 1303,1339 (1 th Cir. 2000).
90. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 139 (2004) (demonstrating that hostileenvironment constructive discharge claims requires a plaintiff to show that a reasonable person
would have felt compelled to resign).
91. Seeid
92. See id. at 2349.
93. See Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 140 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Lawrence v. CNF
Transp., Inc., 340 F.3d 486, 490-495 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff-employee prevailed
on Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims because she proved she was paid less than her male
successor).
94. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
95. See e.g., Walcott v. City of Cleveland, 123 F. App'x 171, 178 (6th Cir. 2005). "To
establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must present evidence sufficient to raise the inference that

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss1/7

12

Vega: Buyer or Victim Beware?: Successor Liability Doctrine Lacks Prope
2017]

BUYER OR VICTIM BEWARE

employment opposed unlawful practices or filed suit, testified, assisted,
or participated in any investigation or hearing against the employers.9 6

Courts usually find that an "adverse employment action" does not
encompass a mere inconvenience or change in responsibilities but that
the action must be "materially adverse" and disruptive. 97 However, the
courts are split on whether Title VII discriminatory retaliation protection

extends to third parties, such as a wife experiencing retaliatory
98
discrimination for the acts of her husband at the same company.
Finally, Title VII requires that employers "assume vicarious
liability for decisionmakers" with some kind of authority. In Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, Congress guided federal courts to interpret Title VII
based on tort agency principles. 99 However, the circuits differ in

determining whether an employer assumes liability for Title VII actions
of non-decisionmakers. The Seventh Circuit held that employers can be
held liable for discriminatory actions by "influential" employees in Lust
v. Sealy.'0 0 On the other hand, the Third and Fourth Circuit held that
employers could only be held liable for discriminatory actions by

decision makers.°10
B. The PrimaFacieFederalSexual HarassmentCase

A plaintiff bringing a sexual harassment suit must first prove that
the conduct was "unwelcome and unsolicited" and that she perceived

that conduct to be offensive. 10 2 Unwelcome conduct can be determined
by whether the plaintiffs conduct indicated that it was unwanted

conduct not whether the participation in any sexual conduct was
voluntary on her part. 10 3 In Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions,Inc.,1°4 the
her protect activity was the likely reason for the 'adverse' action."' Id. at 178 (quoting EEOC v.
Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997).
96. 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-3(a).
97. See DiBrino v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 118 F. App'x. 533, 543-44 (2d Cir. 2004).
98. Compare EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 541, 543-44 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding Title
VII protects third parties) with Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998)
(interpreting Title VII to prohibit third party claims).
99. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754-55 (1998). Plaintiff-employee brought a
Title VII claim against her employer for sexual harassment by her supervisor. Id. at 747, 749. The
employer was held vicariously liable for the supervisor, who had authority over the employee, "if it
knew or should have known about the conduct and failed to stop it." Id.at 759.
100. Lust v. Sealy, 383 F.3d 580, 759 (7th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff-employee brought a Title VII
claim against her employer after she was denied a promotion. Id.at 582-83.
101. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistic Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004); see also
Foster v. New Castle Area Sch. Dist., 98 Fed. Appx. 85 (3d Cir. 2004).
102. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986).
103. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

13

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 35:1

court found that while the sexual harassment was out in the open for the
public to hear, it was directed at the plaintiff-employee specifically
because she was the only woman in the vicinity. 105
There are two types of sexual harassment claims: a quid pro quo
and a hostile work environment. 10 6 Employees claiming a quid pro quo
sexual harassment must prove that their employer took a tangible
employment action against them and that the employee "refused their
unwelcome sexual advances. 10 7 The employer must have "explicitly or
implicitly conditioned a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job
detriment, upon her acceptance of sexual conduct." 10 8 The court has
held that a supervisor who can make an effective recommendation is
enough to establish an offer of employment change.'0 9 On the other
hand, a hostile work environment claim has five elements:
(1) [t]he plaintiff belongs to a protected group; (2) [t]he
plaintiff was subject to unwelcome sexual advances; (3)
[t]he harassment was based on sex; (4) [t]he harassment
affected a term, condition or privilege of the plaintiff's
employment; and (5) [t]he plaintiffs employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take
action to stop or prevent it."1 0
The courts have taken a "totality of the circumstances" approach
when determining if a hostile work environment exists. 1 ' The courts
look to certain factors to help make a determination: (1) the frequency of
the conduct; (2) the severity; (3) whether 'it is physical threatening or
humiliating as opposed to an utterance; (4) whether it is an unreasonable
interference to the employee's work performance; and (5) whether the
complained of conduct undermines the employee's workplace
104. Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions, Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003).
105. Id. at 332.
106. See e.g., Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1312 (lith Cir. 2001)
(denying summary judgment for plaintiff because she failed to show connection between the denial
of a promotion and the refusal of alleged sexual advances).
107. See id.
108. Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 383 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004).
109. See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. Of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1169 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
"[a] supervisor who fires his subordinate because she refuses to comply with his sexual demands
unquestionably commits a "tangible employment action" for purposes of Title VII... A supervisor
who compels a subordinate to submit to such demands by threatening to discharge her if she does
not have sex with him also commits such a 'tangible employment action').
110. Hockman v. Westward Comm. 407 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2004).
111. See id.
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competence. 112 A hostile working environment exists if the harassing
conduct is "so severely permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that the terms and conditions of the employee's
employment were thereby altered."'1 13 A single instance of sexual
harassment can constitute a hostile
working environment but incidents
1 14
must be "more than episodic."
C. CategoricalIssues
Title VII has been criticized for being "irrationally under-inclusive"
in three different ways: (1) at the group level, (2) at the individual level,
and (3) the inequality and second-class nature that exists within the
individual level.115 One analysis particularly criticized Title VII's
categorical approach for being outdated:
[I]t is no longer always possible to say for certain that
an employee did not receive a job because they fit into
one and only one category, or possessed a single
characteristic (e.g. being a member of a certain racial
group); and unlike in 1964, the employer will not
always be so explicit about their reasoning. Today, an
employer might generally cite a job applicant's
"appearance" as their reason for not hiring the
candidate, when they really chose not to hire the
candidate because they are transgender, and/or are a
single parent, and/or because of their political party
affiliation. A discriminatory employer might also make
an adverse employment decision, such as failing to
promote a candidate, for one stated reason (e.g. an
unfriendly attitude), when really the reason was based
on a category-based stereotype such as race or sex.
Employers have had nearly fifty years to become aware
of all of Title VIl's nooks and crannies, faults and weak
points, 6and have learned how to aptly navigate around
them.

11

112.
113.
114.

Seeid.at326.
Lyon v. Jones, 260 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 2004).
Seeid.at512.

115.

Anastasia

Niedrich,

Removing

Categorical Constraints on

Equal

Employment

OpportunitiesandAnti-Discrimination Protections,18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 25, 56- 57 (2011).
116. Id. at 49 ("Discrimination today operates in a fashion such that adding categories and
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1 17
In reality, the statute only protects a limited group of individuals.'
First, Title VII is under-inclusive because it only protects those who
fit into its particular set of categories.1 18 In particular, the transgender
community is not protected by these categories because the rigid
categories have not adapted to the ever changing and expanding LGBTQ
community.11 9 In order to make any kind of categorical changes, it
requires Congress to make amendments or to pass some kind of standalone legislation. 120 Both options can be "inefficient and difficult to
accomplish." 121 In the past, Congress has attempted to amend the
categories in Title VII but it has caused Congress an ample amount of
time debating the issues before an amendment is even passed, therefore
taking away the amendment's anticipatory effects and "forward-thinking
approach.,122 However, the federal courts have proven to be reluctant to
broadly read the categories on a case-by-case basis. 123 Congress has also
attempted to pass stand-alone legislation to expand the Title VII
124
categories but it could take years to pass if it ever actually does.
Federal courts have also read stand-alone legislation more strictly than it
has chosen to read the amendments. 125
Therefore, 1 26
stand-alone
inefficient.
also
is
categories
VII
Title
improve
to
legislation
Second, Title VII is under-inclusive because even those who
technically are covered by the larger categories by definition are placed
outside of those categories by the court's interpretation. 127 Title VII

working within a categorical framework like Title VII will never be sufficient to effectively combat

discrimination. Title VII achieved positive results for many years. However, times have changed,
and revision to the scheme is necessary in order to keep up with the changing face of employment

discrimination and the changing character of employee candidates. The next Part of this Article
addresses the issues with Title VII's categorical approach in greater detail.").
117. See id.at 56.

118. Seeid. at57.
119. See id. at 63-64.
120. See id. at 58.
121. See id.

122. See id. at 58-59 ("This method of legislating is inefficient and does not employ a forwardthinking approach (i.e. an approach that would anticipate and meet the needs of currently
unprotected groups of individuals suffering discrimination before the discrimination against such
individuals is widespread and more difficult to remediate.")).
123. See id.at 58.

124. See id.
125. See id.

126. See id. at 60.
127. See id. at 49, 60 ("All the while, discrimination occurs with assistance from sometimeswitting and other times unwitting courts, which cite judicial restraint and a lack of congressional
guidelines as the reason to deny equal employment protections to the most vulnerable and needy
employees, even under a broad, remedial statute.").
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specifically states that some definitions within the categories "are not
limited to. . ." which would normally read as a broad and inclusive
clause to the category but that is not always the case. 128 In some
instances, the courts have interpreted categories so narrowly that the
interpretation has proved to be detrimental to plaintiffs with a valid
claim or
even a deterrent for those with valid claims who have not
129

filed.

Third, Title VII is underinclusive within the individual category
because it values characteristics that create an unequal treatment of
plaintiffs.13 ° "Both textually and by interpretation," some plaintiffs are
subcategorized as second-class. 13 1
With phrases like "similarly
situated," Title VII only protects those who have certain traits that fulfill
a popular stigma of employees. 132 The courts particularly have
subcategorized transgender plaintiffs as second-class without any Title
VII protection because of its rigid definitions. 113 Unfortunately, this
causes all plaintiffs to be put into classes. Scholars have analyzed the
issue and said,
[] Those who are afforded anti-discrimination
protections based on arbitrary values are safeguarded
while all others are dehumanized, subjected to pervasive
employment discrimination, and prevented from
providing
for themselves
or bettering their
circumstances through gainful employment. Therefore,
Congress's categorical approach is intolerably
dehumanizing because it amounts to a ratification of
discrimination against individuals who are not deemed
members of protected classes, placing a lower value on
their suffering from discrimination because of who they
are as a person. 134
For example, in Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., the Ninth
Circuit held that transsexuals are not a class within the scope of Title

128.

Seeid. at61.

129.

See id.

130.
131.
132.

Seeid. at62.
See id.
See id.

133.

See id.

134.

See id. at 65.
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VII. 135 Furthermore, in Ulane v. E. Airlines the Seventh Circuit held that
discrimination against transsexual employees does not establish a Title
VII discrimination
claim where there was discrimination "because of
6
13

sex."

D. Because of Sex
Title VII requires that the discrimination occur "because of sex" in
order for there to be a valid claim. 137 The language of the act itself does
not help define "sex" but allows the court to interpret and determine its
meaning on a case-by-case basis. 138 The clause protects men and
women but in order to determine whether behavior prompting Title VII
discrimination claims occurs because of sex requires an examination of
the context in regards to the "surrounding circumstances, expectations,
and relationships.
,,139
Title VII also protects individuals who
140
experienced sexual discrimination from members of the same sex.
However, the Court also found that 1Title VII does not necessarily protect
14
from acts merely sexual in nature.
Some courts have afforded specific protections to some gender
subclasses referred to as "sex-plus," including minority women, women
with children, married women. 142 In order for a "sex-plus" complaint to
be successful, the employee must show proof that the individual of the
opposite sex not possessing any "sex-plus" traits were treated

135. Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (Plaintiff-employee
brought a Title VII claim against the employer for employment discrimination and alleged that she
was discharged for her trans-sexuality. The court found that trans-sexuality was not a category
covered by Title VII).
136. Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (Plaintiff-employee had a sex
reassignment surgery. After the employee was fired, the employee brought a Title VII claim against
his employer for employment discrimination. The court found that the employee was transsexual
because he was biologically still male but considered himself female. Then the court found that
trans-sexuality was not a category covered by Title VII).
137. See id. at 1084.
138. Id.
139. Onacle v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
140. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1997).
141. See id (The Court "[r]ecognizing liability for same-sex harassment will not transform
Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace, since Title VII is directed at
discrimination because of sex, not merely conduct tinged with offensive sexual conduct...").
142. See e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam) (Court
distinguishes between women with school-aged children and men with children of the same age if
such distinctions is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise").
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differently. 14 However, many "sex-plus" cases were rejected where
male employees presented a Title VII claim
where their alleged "plus"
1 44
factor was their familial responsibilities.
E. CategoricalDiscriminationand the Actuality Requirement
Many federal courts have also denied plaintiff-employees
145
protection under Title VII for alleged "categorical discrimination."'
Categorical discrimination exists when an employee is discriminated
against for the category that they belong to. This occurs when there is a
misconception discrimination against 146
an individual based on their race,
religion, color, national origin, or sex.
In order for a plaintiff-employee to bring a successful Title VII
claim for categorical discrimination, they must pass the court's
"actuality requirement. '' 147 The actuality requirement
is only met if,
"plaintiffs who suffer from invidious, differential treatment animated by
either their self-ascribed or misperceived protected status will be denied
statutory protection against discrimination [proves] their actual religious,
gender, ethnic, racial, or color identity upon defendant-employers'
challenge. ' 148 For example, a plaintiff-employee who is discriminated
against as one race but is actually another cannot recover. Under the
actuality requirement a plaintiff-employee who is discriminated against
as one race can only recover under Title VII if they are actually a
49
member of that race and it was not just a category misconception.1
The actuality requirement has been both implicitly and explicitly
adopted.1 50 In Afshar v. Pinkerton Academy, the court did not expressly
hold that "misperception discrimination cases" are outside the bounds of

143. See Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1446 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining plaintiffs
allegation that sexual discrimination prevented her from obtaining tenure was unsuccessful because
she did not provide evidence showing that married women were treated differently than married
men.).
144. See id.

145. D.

Wendy

Greene,

Categorically Black,

White,

or

Wrong:

"Misperception

Discrimination" and the State of Title VII Protection, 47 U MICH. J. L. REFORM 87 (Fall, 2013).
146. See id.

147. See id. at 100 ("An actuality requirement has steadily gained momentum in the federal
judiciary within the past decade in categorical discrimination cases involving misperceptions about
the plaintiff's race, national origin, and religion.").
148. Id. at 87.
149. See id. at 90.
150. See id. ("Only intentional discrimination claims based upon an individual's actual
protected status are cognizable under Title VII.").
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Title VII but implicitly adopted the actuality requirement. 15 1 Though the
plaintiffs Muslim background may not have had any bearing on his coworkers' perception of him, the court applied a strict protected class
approach to his discrimination claims. 152 Therefore, the court granted
the plaintiff protection under Title VII and "implicitly affirmed that Title
VII proscribes discrimination on the basis of the plaintiffs actual
protected status. 153 In Butler v. Potter, the court expressly held that
Title VII protection against categorical discrimination requires a
showing of actuality. 5 4 The court held that "Title VII protects those
persons that belong to a protected class, and says nothing about
protection of persons who are perceived to belong to a protected
class. 155 Later, multiple district courts expressly adopted the actuality
requirement. 56
The actuality requirement is "categorically wrong., 157 In an
intentional discrimination case, whether the plaintiff-employee actually
belongs to the category that is being discriminated against should not
matter because the plaintiff is still feeling the discrimination. It allows
discriminators to get away without any repercussions and injures the
plaintiff.15 8 "An employer's misperception of an individual's protected
status does not negate" the employer's discrimination and malicious
intent. 159
F. Title VI's Religious Expansion
There have been proposals to expand the "scope of Title VII to
include rights of employees to dress, groom, or speak in accordance with
that they consider to be their culture."' 160 Such scholars believe that
broadening the scope of the religion category in Title VII claims with a
religious accommodation would help courts expand their interpretation
151. See Afshar v. Pinkerton Acad., No. Civ. 03-137-JD, 2004 WL 1969873, at *3 (D.N.H.
Sept. 7, 2004); see also Greene, supra note 145, at 87.
152. See Afshar v. Pinkerton Acad., No. Civ. 03-137-JD, 2004 WL 1969873, at *4 (D.N.H.
Sept. 7, 2004); see also Greene, supra note 145, at 87.
153. Greene, supra note 146, at 90 (discussing the court's implicit adoption of the actuality
requirement in Afshar, 2004 WL 1969873, at *3).
154. Butler v. Potter Acad., 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
155. Id. at 850.
156. Greene, supranote 145, at 96.
157. Id. at 91.
158. Seeid. at 165.
159. Id. at 102.
160. Karen Engle, The Persistenceof Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation
Provision To Redeem Title VII, 76 TEx. L. REV. 317, 320 (1997).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss1/7

20

Vega: Buyer or Victim Beware?: Successor Liability Doctrine Lacks Prope
2017]

BUYER OR VICTIMBEWARE

of cases involving race, national origin, or sex. 16 1 However, this theory
fails to consider how narrowly the federal courts162have interpreted the
religion category in Title VII cases over the years.
Religion may not be the best way to progress interpretation of Title
VII, because the history of Title VII litigation has not proved to be very
progressive. 163 There are several explanations about how Title VII
litigation has approached the cases regarding religion,
One explanation is that the statute treats religion
differently. Unlike the other protected classifications,
religious conduct, or observance, is explicitly covered
by the statute. Another explanation is that the courts do
not interrogate the relationship between plaintiffs'
claimed religious beliefs and observances to keep the
statute from being successfully challenged under the
Establishment Clause. Still another might be that
religion just feels different from the other categories in
that it seems both compelled and voluntary and that it is
largely about observance... Moreover, it does not
appear that either the protection of both belief and
observance or the refusal of courts to question a
to more
plaintiff's religious beliefs has led
"progressive" results in the religion area. 164
The religious accommodation may not have been the Title VII
expansion that employees had hoped for.
The EEOC responded to the religious accommodation by holding
hearings of its own about it in the 1970s. 165 Employers argued that there
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 431-32 (analyzing the "three dominant modes of thinking in American
antidiscrimination doctrine: (1) that status and conduct are separable, and that only discrimination
based on status is forbidden; (2) that courts should defer to an employer's judgment about how to
structure the workplace, unless specifically mandated by statute or common law to do otherwise;
and (3) that the antidiscrimination norm prohibits treating individuals differently from one another.
Because Title VII religious accommodation doctrine purports to counter each of these three
statements, by abolishing the status-conduct distinction, balancing employer and employee interests,
and requiring preferential treatment, it provides the best ground for studying their entrenchment.
The religious accommodation advocates know all too well that the doctrine has not "worked" for
them. Rather than confronting the demons, however, they often look to other solutions... The
process could be endless.").
164. Id. at 359.
165. Seeid.at381.
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were great potential harms of a broad reading of Title VII and the
difficulty with determining what exactly constitutes a religion and what
religious practices coincide. 166 Three major issues regarding the
relationship between a religious belief and its practices: "The first
considered a need for an institutional affiliation, the second concerned
the difficulty of discerning the sincerity of one's belief, and the third,
involved how employers should respond to the fact that not all members
of any particular religion necessarily agree on observance
requirements." 167 These hearings proved that
employers and courts were
168
accommodation.
religious
the
both against
The EEOC resolved these hearings by issuing a guideline.1 69 The
guidelines do not restrict the definition of religious practices but includes
moral and ethical beliefs. 170 "Under the Guidelines, a belief is religious
not because a religious group professes that belief, but because the
individual sincerely holds that belief with the strength of traditional
religious views." 17 ' By making the definition so broad, the EEOC
relieved employers of the burden of determining which of their
employees' claims for accommodation satisfy the criteria for religious
beliefs and observances and allows them to judge requests simply on the
burden that would be caused if they were to accommodate the
employee. 72 The EEOC guidelines lead to the necessary balancing test
between
employer and employee
interests for reasonable
173
accommodation.
G. PossibleRemedies
174
Title VII aims to make victims whole for their injuries suffered.

166. Seeid. at382.
167. Id. at 382.
168. Id. at 385.
169. See id. at 386 ("Assuming courts were to choose to follow the Guidelines, they would
practically be able to avoid making a determination as to whether a plaintiffs beliefs or practices
were 'religious.' The Guidelines opened up the definition of religion to encompass almost anything
an individual sincerely believes as a theistic, moral, or ethical matter. In addition, they allowed for
dissenting views among members of particular religions about what the obligations of that religion
might be. The second part of the definition foreclosed any examination of the tenets of a particular
religion. Employers are still permitted to question the sincerity of an employee's beliefs but, as
already mentioned, judicial inquiries have been few and far between.").
170. Id.
171. Id. at 385.
172. See id. at 386.
173. See id. at 387.
174. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
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in5
Congress then allowed federal Courts to order that employers found 17
plaintiff.
the
to
relief
equitable
necessary
the
pay
VII
Title
violation of
Equitable remedies include but are not limited to injunctions,
reinstatement, back pay, attorney's fees. 176 A court may order other
affirmative action designed to counter
types of equitable relief such as,
177
discrimination.
the
of
the effect
In some cases a plaintiffs right to relief under Title VII is limited
in mixed motive cases to declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and
attorney's fees. 178 A mixed motive is present where "discrimination
based on Title VII protected classes constitutes at least one of the factors
motivating actions spurring a Title VII plaintiffs claim., 179 The
Supreme Court even determined that a mixed-motive case does not
require direct evidence to be granted relief but rather circumstantial
evidence is enough. 180
As previously mentioned, compensatory and punitive damages are
also available under Title VII cases where an employer has intentionally
discriminated against a plaintiff.181 The amount of legal remedies has
been capped depending on the employer's size.182 Furthermore, a
mixed-motive plaintiff could even receive punitive damages unless
"other factors motivated the disputed action in addition to eliciting
discrimination.,

183

H. Employer Defenses
Title VII allows for employers to assert defenses in discrimination
claims. 184 The courts have also recognized several defenses for Title VII

175.

Id.

176. Id. at 763.
177. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987). The action was challenging the
Alabama Department of Public Safety's practice of excluding African Americans from employment
and the United States Government was added as a party plaintiff. Id. The government had an
"unquestionably compelling interest" in remedying past and present discrimination by a state actor.
Id. at 167.

178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
179. Koffe-Lart & Tyson, supranote 81, at 633.
180. See Dessert Place, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) (interpreting Congress' definition
of "demonstrates" to mean Title VII plaintiffs are not required to utilize direct evidence to show
discrimination, and solving a circuit split).
181. Koffe-Lart & Tyson, supra note 81, at 634 ("A complainant seeking compensatory and
punitive damages can also elect to have her case heard by a jury.").
182. Id.
183.
184.

Id.
Id. at 651.
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defendants including reductions in workforce, 18 narrowly tailored
affirmative action programs,' 86 seniority systems,187 selections based on
particular nondiscriminatory qualifications,188 and other business
reasons.189 An employer can also escape liability by showing that the
employer would have reached the same conclusion without considering
any of the discriminatory factors (i.e., sex or race). 190
Employers can implement affirmative action programs to counter
past discrimination and use those programs to combat present
discrimination and prevent future discrimination.1 9 1 The Court has held
that employers can lawfully take race into account in preferring minority
employees as a group.1 92 Similarly, employers may lawfully take gender
a way to
into account in preferring women employees as a group as
193
workforce.
the
in
women
of
under-representation
the
combat
I. A Recent Decision
As recent as April of 2016, a district court would not allow a victim
of sexual discrimination to hold her successor owner/employer liable for
the alleged sexual discrimination occurring under the previous
owner/employer.' 94 Regena Robinson, a former news director at WLUC
in Michigan's Upper Peninsula, sued her new employer and succeeding
company, Sinclair Broadcasting Group Inc. ("SBG"), which purchased
the station she worked at from Barrington Broadcasting LLC in 2013.195
Ms. Robinson asserted that SBG and its subsidiary, Chesapeake Media I

185. See, e.g., Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998)
(referencing, no Title VII violation because the plaintiff failed to show that the layoff was
pretextual).
186. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987).
187. See Dodd v. Runyon, 178 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 1999).
188. See Arway v. Norwalk Dep't of Police Serv., 125 F.3d 843 (2d Cit. 1997) (unpublished
table decision).
189. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657-58 (1989).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
191. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630.
192. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
193. Koffe-Lart & Tyson, supra note 81, at 654.
194. See Robinson v. Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 182 F. Supp. 3d 742, 750 (W.D. Mich. 2016)
(denying successor liability); see also Kevin McGowan, New TV Station Owner Lacks Successor
Liability for Bias, BLOOMBERG BNA

MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS

REP. (Apr. 22, 2016),

http://0news.bna.com.libweb.hofstra.edu/mani/MALNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=88468506&vna
me-malmotallissues&wsn=492616000&searchid=29192286&doctypeid= I&type=date&mode=doc
&split=0&scm=MALNWB&pg-O (discussing the recent decision in Robinson v. Sinclair
BroadcastingGroup, Inc. and its implications).
195. Robinson, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 743-45.
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LLC should be held "liable under federal and state law for WLUC's
racially and sexually hostile work environment, based on incidents
dating from August 201 1.,,196
Ms. Robinson describes that the
harassment occurred after SBG took over in November 2013 and before
she resigned in January 2014.197
Ms. Robinson's complaint asserted specific conduct by her
supervisor and the stations general manager, Robert Jamros.1 98 While
working at WLUC, Mr. Jamros made several comments alluding to Ms.
Robinson's race. 199 For example, Mr. Jamros made comments about an
Afro, he told Ms. Robinson that "you all with dark skin look the same,"
and he told a news consultant that Ms. Robinson did not look like a news
director but that the previous director who was a white male did actually
look like a news director.2"'
The following timeline was presented to the court as a "consistent
conflict" that created the hostile work environment between Ms.
Robinson and her supervisor, Mr. Jamros throughout 2012 and 2013.201
On April 24, 2012, Ms. Robinson notified Barrington's human resources
department of Mr. Jamros' actions.20 2 On April 25, 2012, Mr. Jamros
took it upon himself to interview members of Ms. Robinson's staff
because he felt that there was a "lack of harmony" within her
department. 203
Afterwards, Mr. Jamros met with Robinson and
"completed an interim performance comment form" to keep in Ms.
Robinson's file criticizing her leadership abilities. 20 4 , On May 2, 2012,
Mr. Jamros met with Ms. Robinson and her senior staff members to once
again tell Ms. Robinson that she must improve her management of her
staff.20 5 In August of 2012, Ms. Robinson complained to senior
management at Barrington's, that her predecessor was still in the
newsroom a year later, when he was only supposed to be there for a
month transition period.20 6 In the same month, "Jamros interviewed
,Robinson's staff [again] and met with Ms. Robinson about her

196.

McGowan, supranote 194.

197.

Id.

198. See Robinson, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 743.
199. Id. at 744.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. This notification is cited as the first notice of any harassment. See id.
203. Id.
204. Id. This was the first of many interviews conducted by Mr. Jamros based on his own
personal opinions of Ms. Robinson. Id.
205.

Id.

206. Id.
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He filed a complaint with the company

documenting that meeting.
On January 15, 2013, Mr. Jamros filed another complaint with the
company stating that Ms. Robinson was insubordinate in a staff meeting
and that he threatened to fire her if she ever did it again.20 9 On February
4, 2013, "Robinson complained to Barrington's human resources
department that Jamros and Asplund were mistreating her because she
was an African-American woman." 210 That same day, Ms. Robinson
211
voiced the same complaint to Barrington's President, Chris Cornelius.
Mr. Cornelius held a meeting with Mr. Jamros and Mr. Asplund and
where Mr. Asplund's schedule was subsequently changed so that he
would not work at the same time as Ms. Robinson.2 12
On February 28, 2013, "Sinclair Television Group ("STG"), a
wholly owned subsidiary of SBG, entered into an asset purchase
agreement to purchase WLUC assets from Barrington., 213 SBG then
created Chesapeake to "serve as a holding company for WLUC" on
March 11, 2013.214

In September of 2013, Mr. Jamros reversed the

change to Asplund's schedule so that he could work with Ms. Robinson
again in spite of Ms. Robinson's protests.2 15 In the same month Mr.
Jamros had told Robinson to "stop being so emotional. 2 16 On
November 22, 2013 STG took over WLUC but "[t]he takeover did not
substantially affect business, and most employees maintained their
positions and duties. 217
In December of 2013, Mr. Jamros filed another complaint with the
company stating that "Robinson had put a segment on the news against
Mr. Jamros's instruction., 2 18 In the same month, Mr. Jamros spoke to
SBG's human resources director, Allison Kiniry, and SBG's regional
manager, Chris Manson about his concerns with Ms. Robinson's
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 744-45 (indicating that a successor employer is now operating the company).
214. Id. at 745.
215. Id. at 744.
216. Id. Ms. Robinson cites this as verbal harassment. Id.
217. Id. at 745. The fact that the takeover did not substantially affect business and that most
employees kept their positions and the same duties that they had under the previous owner is
important to the court's analysis in deciding whether the successor is substantially similar to the
prior owner. Id.
218. Id.
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management.219 On January 2, 2014 Asplund submitted a complaint
through SBG's intranet site citing concerns about Ms. Robinson's
leadership abilities.22 ° On January 7, 2014, Kiniry and Manson held a
phone call with Ms. Robinson and Mr. Jamros to discuss Robinson's
performance. During that call, Ms. Robinson complained that she had
been harassed based on her race and gender and that she was in the
process of putting together an EEOC complaint.2 21 On the same day,
Ms. Robinson said she "was uncomfortable meeting with Mr. Jamros
alone," and Kiniry responded that they "should not meet without a
human resources representative present., 222 Ms. Robinson did not
discuss on the phone call that she had received an "anonymous letter
earlier that morning that made hateful and threatening remarks based on
Robinson's race and gender. 2 23 On January 8, 2014 Mr. Jamros asked
Ms. Robinson to discuss the previous day's call with him in her office,
but Ms. Robinson refused and reminded him that they were advised not
to meet without a human resources representative present and refused to
do so. 22 4 That same day, Ms. Robinson then sent Kiniry and Manson
numerous emails informing them that Mr. Jamros had come into her
office.225 On January 10, 2014, Ms. Robinson sent her resignation letter
to WULC. 226 Even though Ms. Robinson said that she would stay until
January 30, Ms. Kiniry told Ms. Robinson that "it would be best if she
did not work after January 10," she would however be paid until January
30.227 Later that month, Kiniry then conducted an investigation of the
harassment and discrimination allegations and concluded that they were
unsubstantiated.22 8
The Defendants in this case argued that they could not be held
liable for actions that took place under the previous owner. 229

Ms.

Robinson did not respond to that assertion but only claimed that WLUC
is a separate entity that can be held liable as well. The court started its
analysis on EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc. when
219. Id.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. This is not conclusive of whether the alleged harassment and discrimination did or did
not create a hostile work environment for Ms. Robinson. Id.
229. Id. The successor employer insisted that the successor liability doctrine did not apply to
them in this case. Id. They claimed to be unaware of the situation at the time of purchase. Id.
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analyzing the issue of successor liability:
[i]n EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., the
Sixth Circuit held that successor employers may be held
liable in Title VII cases based on equitable
considerations. The court listed nine factors, which
essentially boil down to three factors: (1) whether there
is substantial continuity of business operations, (2)
whether the successor employer had notice of the
predecessor's legal obligation, and (3)23the
ability of the
0
relief.
adequate
provide
to
predecessor
However, the court heavily relied upon the subsequent Sixth Circuit
Case, Wiggins v. Spector FreightSys. Inc., where the court limited the
applicability of successor liability. 231 This court held:
a successor employer may not be held liable if (1)
charges were not filed with the EEOC at the time of the
acquisition and (2) the successor corporation had no
notice of any claim of discrimination at the time of the
acquisition. Wiggins expressly held that where these
two conditions exist, a case is "remove[d] ... from the
rationale" of MacMillan and successor liability does not
attach.232
The Sixth Circuit then reaffirmed that holding in Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co. 23 3 and the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the
230. Id. at 747 (citing EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir.
1974) The original nine factors included:
1) whether the successor company had notice of the charge, 2) the ability of
the predecessor to provide relief, 3) whether there has been a substantial
continuity of business operations, 4) whether the new employer uses the same
plant, 5) whether he uses the same or substantially the same work force, 6)
whether he uses the same or substantially the same supervisory personnel, 7)
whether the same jobs exist under substantially the same working conditions,
8) whether he uses the same machinery, equipment and methods of
production and 9) whether he produces the same product.
MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d at 1094.
231. Robinson, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (citing Wiggins v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 583 F.2d
882, 886 (6th Cir. 1978)). In Wiggins, an African American appellant/employees of appellee truck
line brought a claim for racial discrimination. 583 F.2d at 884.
232. Robinson, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (citing Wiggins, 583 F.2d at 886).
233. Robinson, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 747; see Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1986) (affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant employer in
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Wiggins limitation to successor liability in Stevens v. McLouth Steel
Prods.Corp. in order to further apply it to similar cases.234
In this case, Ms. Robinson did not file a charge with the EEOC
until after SBG took over WLUC and SBG provided an affidavit that
said they had no notice of any potential claims by Ms. Robinson.2 35 Ms.

Robinson disputed that assertion, stating that she had informed
Barrington's human resources department of the alleged harassment,
however, informing those employees would not give notice to SBG or
its subsidiaries because they were only employed until November
2013.236 This court felt that they gave Ms. Robinson "ample opportunity
to point to evidence that
either Defendant had notice of any kind [but]
23 7
So.",
do
to
she failed
Almost all of the alleged incidents occurred before SBG took over
WLUC in November 2013.238 The court held that "Ms. Robinson's
receipt of the letter would likely be sufficient to sustain a hostile work
environment claim if she could demonstrate that Jamros (or someone
else at WLUC) sent it to her., 239 However, "Robinson has no evidence
that anyone affiliated with WLUC sent the letter" and the court did not
believe that a reasonable jury could conclude that the identified incidents
that occurred constitute harassment so severe that it would alter Ms.
Robinson's conditions of employment.2 40 The court said, "[t]he factors
identified by the Sixth Circuit do not indicate that such actions [actions
by Mr. Jamros and other WLUC employees] rose to the level of
241
actionable harassment.,

Ms. Robinson's prima facie case of sexual harassment and a hostile
work environment failed.242 In accordance with case law precedent the
court held:
[a] plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment claim
plaintiff employee's action charging sex discrimination and sexual harassment because plaintiff
failed to sustain any of the claims which were asserted).
234. Robinson, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 747; see Stevens v. McLouth Steel Prods. Corp., 446
N.w.2d 95, 99-100 (Mich. 1989) (holding successor liability in a cause of action brought pursuant
to the Michigan Civil Rights Act was foreclosed where'. .. the successor corporation had no notice
of the discrimination claim prior to the acquisition date).
235.

Robinson, 182 F.Supp 3d at 747.

236. Id.at 743-44, 748, 750.
237. Id.at 747.
238. Id at 750.
239. Id. at 748.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.

242.

See id. at 750.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

29

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 35:1

under Title VII or [Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act]
must demonstrate that "(1) she belonged to a protected
group, (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment,
(3) the harassment was based on race, (4) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of employment and create an abusive
working environment, and (5) the defendant knew or
should3 have known about the harassment and failed to
24
act.
This court followed many cases that have decided this complicated
issue before. 2 " In particular, the court followed Harris v. Forklift Sys.
Inc. in finding that only harassment that is "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [the plaintiffs] employment and
' 245
create an abusive working environment is actionable under Title VII.
It is required by Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ. that "both an objective
and a subjective test must be met: the conduct must be severe or
pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive and the victim must subjectively regard
that environment as abusive. 246 It is also common for courts to look to
all the circumstances in determining whether an environment is hostile
or abusive, including "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating; or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance."2 47
The court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment
because Ms. Robinson did not demonstrate that "she was subject to
243. Id. at 746 (quoting Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2011))
(holding further, when determining a working environment is abusive, courts consider harassment
"by all perpetrators combined" with regard to the plaintiff's race. "A plaintiff may prove that
harassment was based on race by either (1) direct evidence of the use of race-specific and
derogatory terms or (2) comparative evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of
both races in a mixed-race workplace.").
244. See Robinson, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 746-49.
245. Id. at 746 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) ("Though the District
Court did conclude that the work environment was not 'intimidating or abusive to [Harris], 'it did so
only after finding that the conduct was not 'so severe as to be expected to seriously affect plaintiff's
psychological well-being,' and that Harris was not 'subjectively so offended that she suffered
injury'... We therefore reverse.").
246. Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000).
247. Harris, 510 U.S. at 17 ("The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is
relevant in determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while
psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is
required.").

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol35/iss1/7

30

Vega: Buyer or Victim Beware?: Successor Liability Doctrine Lacks Prope
2017]

BUYER OR VICTIMBEWARE

harassment that was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of
her employment and create an abusive working environment. 24 8 The
fact that the alleged incidents mostly occurred before the defendant took
over WLUC, because Ms. Robinson had not filed an EEOC claim before
that time, and Defendants had no notice of a potential claim, the court
refused to hold the defendants liable for any harassment that occurred
before November 2013.249 The court was so bold as to say, "[elven if
Defendants were liable for events that transpired before 2013, however,
the incidents that Robinson cites are simply part of the ordinary
tribulations of a workplace, and are not sufficient to sustain a claim
under Title VII or ELCRA. ' ' 25 0 The court finally summarized:
Robinson does not show that she faced harassment that
was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of
her employment and create an abusive working
environment, even if the Court considers the entirety of
Robinson's tenure at WLUC. Aside from four remarks
that she found offensive, she has pointed only to
criticism based on her work performance. While such
criticism may have caused Robinson distress, it was part
of the 'ordinary tribulations of the workplace,' and not
the sort of 'extreme' conduct necessary to maintain a
hostile work environment claim. To find otherwise
would turn Title VII into a 'general civility code,'
as the
251
Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against.
J. A New Category
Today, the EEOC has had the opportunity to file Title VII suits on
behalf of transgender employees and it could then be added to the
successor liability analysis.252 In particular, today's society has dealt
with the debate over whether denying a transgender employee equal
access to common -restroom corresponding to the employee's gender

248.
249.

Robinson, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 750.
Id.

250.

Id.

251.

Id.at 749-50 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).

252. See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, Fact Sheet: Bathroom Access Right for
TransgenderEmployees Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of11964,

https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-bathroom-access-transgender.cfm
2017).
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identity is sex discrimination.2 5 3 The EEOC defines "transgender" as
referring to "people whose gender identity and/or expression is different
from the sex assigned to them at birth., 25 4 The EEOC's website reads:
In addition to other federal laws, EEOC enforces Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
employment discrimination based on race, color,
national origin, religion, and sex (including pregnancy,
gender identity, and sexual orientation). Title VII
applies to private and state/local government employers
with 15 or more employees, as well as to federal
agencies in their capacity as employers. 55
Thankfully, contrary state law is not a defense under Title VII.256
In Macy v. Dep 't of Justice, the EEOC ruled that discrimination based on
transgender status is sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 257 In

Lusardi v. Dep 't of the Army 25 8, the EEOC held that denying an
employee equal access to a common restroom corresponding to the
employee's gender identity is sex discrimination:
[an employer cannot] condition this right on the
employee undergoing or providing proof of surgery or
any other medical procedure; and, [an employer cannot]
avoid the requirement to provide equal access to a

253. Id.
254. Id.
The term transgender woman typically is used to refer to someone who was
assigned the male sex at birth but who identifies as a female. Likewise, the
term transgender man typically is used to refer to someone who was assigned
the female sex at birth but who identifies as male. A person does not need to
undergo any medical procedure to be considered a transgender man or a
transgender woman.
Id.
255. Id. ("Like all non-discrimination provisions, these protections address conduct in the
workplace, not personal beliefs. Thus, these protections do not require any employee to change
beliefs. Rather, they seek to ensure appropriate workplace treatment so that all employees may
perform their jobs free from discrimination.").
256. Id.
257. Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20, 2012) (holding that
intentional discrimination against a transgender individual because that person is transgender is, by
definition, discrimination "based on... sex," and such discrimination therefore violates Title VIL).
258. Lusardi, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133395, 2015 WL 1607756 (Mar. 27, 2015) (finding that
that Complainant proved that she was subjected to disparate treatment on the basis of sex when she
was denied equal access to the common female restroom facilities).
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common [restroom] by restricting a transgender
employee to a single-user restroom instead (though the
employer can make a single-user restroom available to
259
all employees who might choose to use it).

The court has seemed to agree with the EEOC.26 ° In G.G. ex rel.
Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that Title IX's prohibition against sex
discrimination requires educational institutions to provide transgender
students restroom access consistent with their gender identity.26 1
However, the question remains, how will the courts deal with such a
discrimination claim when it is to be analyzed with a successor liability
claim?
The EEOC is doing its part to analyze the situation and come up
with solutions to make everyone protected under Title VII. The first
step is always filing with the EEOC and if they are on the side of the
complainant, the process is expedited and deference may be given to the
agency's expertise. However, successor liability may not necessarily be
considered the agency's expertise. Someone may be held liable but it
may not be the successor.
III. SOLUTION
The successor liability doctrine has always been decided on a caseby-case basis with a heavy factual analysis.262 This was a new concept
decades ago but now after countless cases and a circuit split, victim
employees with successor employers have fallen through the cracks of
Title VII protection and have been left in limbo without any redress.263
In order to reconcile these issues, Congress must enact a statute or add
yet another amendment to Title VII. This law must be overarching in
order to be truly effective.

259. U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, supra note 257.
260. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 730 (4th Cir. 2016)
(Niemeyer, J., concurring), vacated 137 S.Ct. 1239.
261. Id. at 722.
262. EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir. 1974)
(Courts that have considered the successorship question in a labor context have found a multiplicity
of factors to be relevant.").
263. Id. at 1091 ("Failure to hold a successor employer liable for the discriminatory practices
of its predecessor could emasculate the relief provisions of Title Vn by leaving the discriminatee
without a remedy or with an incomplete remedy.").
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A. Congress and EEOC Solve the Problem
The foundation of this solution depends upon the action of
Congress.264 In order to effectively help victim employees in Title VII
successor liability suits Congress must enact a statute that applies across
the country. This could be done with an amendment to the current Title
VII that is strictly for successor liability suits; however, we have seen
how difficult it can be to get an amendment approved in a timely
fashion, if ever.265 Another option would be to empower the EEOC with
the ability to promulgate a rule
that would solve the national confusion
266
about how to treat successors.
This statute would require a business that is considering a sale or
merger to survey their employees anonymously about any pending Title
VII suits or any possible Title VII suits that have not yet been filed.
After the results of the survey are reviewed, the statute will then impose
a duty upon that owner to disclose this information to possible new
owners and to the EEOC. The EEOC must have proof that this process
has occurred prior to the sale. It is the successor's responsibility to make
sure that this process has occurred or else they are purchasing a business
at their own risk.
After the EEOC has been notified, the statute will give them the
power to do a "check-in" on the businesses' employees before any sale
or purchase is made. This is meant to encourage victim employees to
step forward to an unbiased entity. The EEOC needs to be more
involved in the merger and acquisition process, however, there is an
issue with the fact that a successor cannot be held liable unless there is a
pending EEOC charge at the time of the sale or purchase.2 67 A victim
employee may be unaware that the company is being purchased or
264. Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal Employment
Opportunities and Anti-DiscriminationProtections, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 25, 58, 64 (2011)

("With the passage of Title VII in 1964, and with subsequent amendments, Congress made policy
decisions and performed valuations that ratified discrimination against some in an attempt to
eradicate discrimination against others.").
265. Id. at 36, 58, 60. (discussing the complications of actually getting an amendment to Title
VII passed).
266. Id. at 32 ("Congress enacted Title VII with the aim of exterminating discriminatory
employment practices. The statute imposes certain obligations on employers, grants certain rights
to employers and employees, and also establishes an administrative entity (the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")) to enforce parties' rights.").
267. EEOC, 503 F.2d at 1093 ("If the charging requirement is read in light of the statute of
limitations, it is reasonable to assume, at least in the case of successor companies, that Congress
only intended that a discriminatee be required to name those who were known to him and could
have been charged within the period of limitations.").
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merged and they just haven't filed a claim yet. 268 This is asking a victim
employee to bypass any and all psychological trauma that the
harassment or discrimination has caused. It is also giving the successor
employer a get-out-of-jail-free card if the previous employer does not
have any available assets to properly redress a victim employee. This
requirement would need to be eliminated by this new statute or
amendment.
Finally, this statute could also give power to the courts to interpret
Title VII successor liability claims on a case-by-case basis but using the
same factors as every other court is mandated to do so. This would help
eliminate any confusion among the circuits and even among employees
and employers. By using factors from the original nine-factor test and
the condensed three-factor test,269 this analysis, in my view, would be
equally fair to both parties. This new test would consist of five-factors
and the court should consider the following questions: (1) whether the
successor employer had prior notice of the claim or notice of the survey;
(2) whether the alleged harasser or discriminator is still working there;
(3) whether there is sufficient continuity in the business operations of the
predecessor and the successor; (4) whether the predecessor is able to
provide the proper relief; and (5) whether there is another option for the
plaintiff to receive a remedy without holding the successor liable.
B. PossibleNegative Effects
With new legislation comes the possibility of negative effects and
unpopularity. This law in particular begs several questions such as,
whether the right person paying the price, whether this is placing a
burden on the economy and unnecessarily lengthening the merger or
acquisition process, whether the law would deter businesses from
wanting to engage in these types of deals, and whether the new law
would allow the new claims to flood the courts.
First, a law that would give more protection to victim employees
and more procedures to employers might be construed by courts to hold
268.

See Jeff Schmitt, 10 Signs Your Company Is for Sale, FORBES.COM (Aug. 9, 2012, 10:10

AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/08/09/10-signs-your-company-isfor-sale/#632d5a5840b4.
269. The refined three-factor test requires courts to consider: (1) whether the successor
employer had prior notice of the pending claim against the predecessor; (2) whether the predecessor
is able to provide the requested relief; and (3) whether there is sufficient continuity in the business
operations of the predecessor and the successor to justify the imposition of liability. Brzozowski v.
Correctional Physician Servs., Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing Rego v. ARC Water
Treatment Co., 181 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1999)).
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successors liable more often than they used to. This law would create
more requirements that need to be met in order for a successor to meet
their standard of due diligence in order to escape liability. This could
then cause a problem about whether the right entity/person is being held
liable. A prior owner may escape liability completely when in theory
they are the correct ones to hold liable.
Second, although the new requirements set out by this statute serve
to make possible purchasers aware of any unlawful employment
practice, it may unnecessarily lengthen the merger or acquisition process
The
and cause that business or even the economy to suffer.
requirements would take ample time to complete and various entities to
be involved.
Third, the extra requirements could even deter businesses from ever
participating in a merger or acquisition because the process may become
too burdensome. The new law would actually be a better way to protect
successors from inheriting these lawsuits but they wouldn't have to
worry about that if they never enter into any purchase agreements.
Finally, this new federal law may flood the courts and impede
judicial efficiency. By eliminating some of the requirements to go
through the EEOC first, victim employees may file more suits in court
that are premature or unwarranted.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Note attempted to solve the issues of the requirements victim'
employees are required to meet in order to recover for sexual harassment
and discrimination in the workplace under the successor liability
doctrine. The EEOC has guidelines and procedures that should be
followed but the time constraints can prove to be hard to follow and
should be amended. The requirement of a pending EEOC charge at the
time of purchase in order to hold a successor liable in a Title VII suit is
especially problematic. Asking a victim employee to rush the litigation
process and their healing process is both a systemic problem and a
psychological issue. Lastly, the courts have their own way of analyzing
on a case-by-case basis that could not possibly give any victim employee
a realistic expectation of what the outcome might be. 270 This is
portrayed further through the prevalent circuit split and it has shown to
leave many victim employees without any type of redress because they
are often stuck in limbo. The successor liability doctrine does not
270. See EEOC v. MacMillanBloedel Containers,Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (6th Cir. 1974).
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effectively protect victim employees, as it should.
..
A new federal law is the best solution in an attempt to solve a
problem that has lasted decades. This law would keep the business
economy flowing and it would not scare businesses away from
purchasing other companies. It would require a successor to do more
research before purchasing a business and it would impose a new duty
upon the prior owner to survey its employees before selling and a duty to
then truthfully disclose the results of that survey to the new owner and to
the EEOC. Before a sale is to be made, the EEOC needs to be notified
in order to decide whether to "check-in" with employees about their
work environment. This would eliminate the requirement of a pending
EEOC claim at the time of sale, while simultaneously encouraging
employees to come forward. Although there are various possible
negative effects that could arise from this federal law, the additional
protections for potential victim employees may outweigh those
negatives. This law may also get approved because it provides a
safeguard for both sides. In the end, the statute would continue the
common notion of buyer-beware, rather than victim-beware, in merger
or acquisition deals.
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